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Abstract
Public investment, through both research grants and university funding, plays a crucial role in the research and development 
(R&D) of novel health technologies, including diagnostics, therapies, and vaccines, to address the coronavirus disease 
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Using the example of remdesivir, one of the most promising COVID-19 treatments, this 
paper traces back public contributions to different stages of the innovation process. Applying the Risk-Reward Nexus 
framework to the R&D of remdesivir, we analyse the role of the public in risk-taking and reward and address inequities 
in the biomedical innovation system. We discuss the collective, cumulative and uncertain characteristics of innovation, 
highlighting the lack of transparency in the biomedical R&D system, the need for public investment in the innovation 
process, and the “time-lag” between risk-taking and reward. Despite the significant public transnational contributions 
to the R&D of remdesivir, the rewards are extracted by few actors and the return to the public in the form of equitable 
access and affordable pricing is limited. Beyond the necessity to treat remdesivir as a global public good, we argue that 
biomedical innovation needs to be viewed in the broader concept of public value to prevent the same equity issues 
currently seen in the COVID-19 pandemic. This requires the state to take a market-shaping rather than market-fixing 
role, thereby steering innovation, ensuring that patents do not hinder global equitable access and affordable pricing and 
safeguarding a global medicines supply. 
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Background 
With 21.9 million confirmed coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) cases at the time of writing1 (August 18, 
2020), scientists across the world are partaking in a race 
to identify diagnostics, treatments and vaccines for severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). 
Many of these novel research initiatives are headed by 
public sector institutions, including universities and non-
profit organisations, which lead nearly a third of vaccine 
development projects2. Public investments are a vital catalyst 
for accelerating the research and development (R&D) of new 
health technologies to address the coronavirus pandemic, as 
highlighted by Universities Allied for Essential Medicines’ 
public funding tracker.3
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines health 
innovation in the context of biomedical R&D as a “new or 
improved” product that “improves people’s health and well-
being.”4 COVID-19 has highlighted the underlying existing 
health disparities within our societies, with vulnerable groups 
being more susceptible to becoming infected or developing 
severe disease and dying.5-7 Due to existing inequities in the 
current pharmaceutical system regarding pricing, production 
capacity, and health system resources, issues with equitable 
access to health technologies for COVID-19 inevitably arise. 
The divide in access to novel treatments, diagnostics and 
vaccines will be especially poignant between higher- and 
lower-income countries and may deepen existing health 
disparities within countries themselves.
In this paper we trace back public contributions to different 
stages of the R&D process of Gilead Sciences’ (Gilead) 
remdesivir, which is currently undergoing multiple clinical 
trials as a promising candidate treatment for SARS-CoV-2. 
Based on the R&D of other drugs, we hypothesise that public 
funding and research conducted at publicly-funded research 
institutions (PFRIs) played an important role in driving 
forward remdesivir’s R&D, whereas few actors would reap 
the benefits. In order to test this hypothesis, we systematically 
search the pre-pandemic scientific literature on publications 
on remdesivir, and analyse main sponsorship of clinical trials 
on remdesivir to approximate the public contributions into 
the R&D of this therapeutic. 
We introduce the Risk-Reward Nexus8 proposed by Lazonick 
and Mazzucato and apply this framework to biomedical 
innovation, using remdesivir as a case study. Analysing the 
relationship between innovation and inequity, we discuss 
the collective, cumulative and uncertain characteristics of 
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innovation. Furthermore, we critically appraise the actors 
that contributed to the innovation process and the actors that 
appropriate returns from the innovation. Beyond looking at 
the inequities in risk and rewards in biomedical innovation, 
we discuss remdesivir in the context of global health equity 
meaning that “everyone should have a fair opportunity to 
achieve their full health potential,”9 which we argue should be 
an integral component of biomedical innovation during this 
pandemic and beyond. We thereby seek to create a framework 
that is applicable to other health innovations relevant to the 
COVID-19 pandemic and new health technologies more 
generally.
Methods
Pre-pandemic Scientific Literature 
We systematically searched the pre-pandemic scientific 
literature on remdesivir from 2012, when its molecular 
structure was first published by Cho et al, until the end of 
2019, when COVID-19 first emerged. For this purpose we 
searched PubMed, Ovid, and Google Scholar for primary 
research studies published in English on “remdesivir” or 
“GS-5734” (see Supplementary file 1 discloses the complete 
search strategies used in this paper). Additionally, we asked 
colleagues for studies not identified by our original search 
and used snowballing to look for further references missed. 
Searches were conducted between the 6th and 18th of July.
From the papers identified we extracted the affiliation of the 
first and final author, categorising these affiliations as “Gilead,” 
“other private actor,” or as being a PFRI. For the purpose of this 
paper we defined PFRIs as including universities, hospitals, 
government agencies, research funding bodies, charities, or 
any other institution that receives public funds or relies on 
donations from the public. From the complete author list we 
calculated how many of the total affiliations fell into these 
three categories as well. In these calculations we took into 
account that some authors list more than one affiliation, and 
in such instances we weighted both affiliations equally. We 
also compiled a list of PFRI affiliations and the countries in 
which these PFRIs are based. 
Grant Information
Next, we extracted the different public funding bodies that 
contributed to the study from the acknowledgement section 
of identified articles. Where possible, we obtained grant 
numbers and traced these back to the original funding bodies 
to list the amount and purpose of the grant. We supplemented 
our findings with information from briefings by the US-
based non-for profit organisations Knowledge Ecology 
International10 and Public Citizen,11 which previously 
investigated the public contributions towards remdesivir’s 
R&D process.
Clinical Trial Sponsorship
After assessing academic publications on remdesivir that 
preceded the COVID-19 pandemic, we also systematically 
searched for clinical trials on remdesivir registered on 
ClinicalTrials.gov. All registered trials listing remdesivir 
or GS-5734 as the primary intervention were included and 
the main trial sponsor was categorised as “Gilead,” “other 
private actor,” or “PFRI.” Next, we disseminated whether trials 
sponsored by PFRIs were conducted by a university, hospital, 
charity, or government agency. We put university hospitals 
in the category “hospital.” We also noted the countries in 
which these PFRIs were based. Both interventional trials and 
observational studies were included to capture both trials 
studying the efficacy as well as the safety of the drug. Firstly, 
we searched through all trials mentioning “remdesivir” or 
“GS-5734,” the molecular compound name of remdesivir. 
Additionally, an advanced search with “interventional 
(clinical) trials” or “observational trials” as filters was 
conducted, for trials in which “remdesivir” was used as one of 
the main interventions. We excluded studies listing remdesivir 
as a part of the standard of care of the control group, as these 
trials do not directly study the clinical efficacy or safety of the 
drug. The search was conducted on July 17, 2020.
Results 
Pre-pandemic Scientific Literature 
Our systematic search of the pre-pandemic scientific literature 
through PubMed, Ovid, and Google Scholar identified 14 
articles published between 2012-2019 on remdesivir or GS-
5734 (see Supplementary file 1). Of the 14 publications, only 
two listed Gilead as the primary affiliation for the first and 
final author (Table 1). Apart from the first publication that 
identified the molecular structure of remdesivir, which was 
authored by in-house scientists of Gilead, PFRI-affiliations on 
the author list ranged from 15%-100%, with on average more 
than half of the author affiliations being linked to a PFRI 
(64% ± 27% (SD)). Researchers involved in the early research 
on remdesivir were affiliated with PFRIs in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Poland, Belgium, Guinea, Canada, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Senegal, France, as 
well as the WHO, which contributed to the first clinical trial 
of remdesivir in humans.
Grant Information
We identified at least 20 different sources of public funding 
into remdesivir’s R&D through research grants, academic 
fellowships, or core funding from government agencies 
(Table 2 and Supplementary file 2). Except for one article 
which did not disclose its funding sources (Dörnemann et 
al17), all studies published after the original remdesivir study by 
Cho et al acknowledged at least one source of public funding. 
Although the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) funded 
most of the research into remdesivir, grants from the United 
Kingdom and Canadian funding bodies also played a role in 
the public investment into the R&D process of this drug.
Clinical Trial Sponsorship
We identified 24 relevant clinical trials registered on 
ClinicalTrials.gov using remdesivir as an intervention or 
studying its safety (Table 3; see Supplementary 3 for full search 
results, recruitment status, phase of trial and URL to the 
respective clinical trials). Of the 24 clinical trials registered, 
4 were sponsored by “Gilead,” 2 by “other private actors” 
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Table 1. The Contribution of PFRIs to Publications on Remdesivir (GS-5734) Between 2012-2019
Publication Title Year First Author First Author Affiliation Final Author Final Author Affiliation Specification Authors Affiliation PFRIa Percentage Affiliations PFRI
Synthesis and antiviral activity of a series of 10-substituted 
4-aza-7,9-dideazaadenosine C-nucleosides 2012 Cho, Aesop
12 Gilead Kim, Choung U. Gilead NA 0
Therapeutic efficacy of the small molecule GS-5734 against 
Ebola virus in rhesus monkeys 2016
Warren, Travis 
K.13 USAMRIID Bavari, Sina  USAMRIID
USAMRIID; Therapeutic Development Center; CDC; 
Boston University School of Medicine, Boston 57%








Royal Free London NHS 
Foundation Trust
Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust; 
University College London; Edinburgh Royal 
Infirmary; Public Health England; Queen Elizabeth 
University Hospital Glasgow; MRC–University of 
Glasgow Centre for Virus Research, Glasgow, UK
100%
Broad-spectrum antiviral GS-5734 inhibits both epidemic 
and zoonotic coronaviruses 2017
Sheahan, 
Timothy P.15 UNCCH Baric, Ralph S. UNCCH UNCCH; VUMC; Jagiellonian University 43%
GS-5734 and its parent nucleoside analog inhibit Filo, 
Pneumo-, and Paramyxoviruses 2017 Lo, Michael K.
16 CDC Spiropoulou, Christina F. CDC CDC 41%
First newborn baby to receive experimental therapies 






Annick Médecins Sans Frontières
Médecins Sans Frontières Belgium and Guinea; 
Institute of Tropical Medicine Antwerp; CDC; 
Emory University
100%
Discovery and synthesis of a phosphoramidate prodrug of 
a Pyrrolo[2,1-f][triazin-4-amino] Adenine C-Nucleoside (GS-
5734) for the treatment of Ebola and emerging viruses
2017 Siegel, Dustin18 Gilead Mack-man, Richard L. Gilead USAMRIID; University of California; CDC 15%
Coronavirus susceptibility to the antiviral remdesivir 
(GS-5734) is mediated by the viral polymerase and the 
proofreading exoribonuclease
2018 Agostini, Maria L.19 VUMC
Denison, Mark 
R. VUMC VUMC; UNCCH; University of the South 63%
Initiation, extension, and termination of RNA synthesis by a 
paramyxovirus polymerase 2018
Jordan, Paul 
C.20 Allos BioPharma Deval, Jerome Allos BioPharma CDC 25%
Remdesivir (GS-5734) protects African green monkeys from 
Nipah virus challenge 2018 Lo, Michael K.
21  CDC Wit, Emmie De NIAID CDC; NIAID 79%
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Institut National de 
Recherche Biomédicale 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo
Nordwall, 
Jacqueline University of Minnesota
Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale;  
International Medical Corps; Médecins sans 
Frontières; the World Health Organisation; the 
Alliance for International Medical Action; the 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development 
Authority; NIAID; University of Minnesota
75%
Mechanism of inhibition of Ebola virus RNA-dependent RNA 
polymerase by remdesivir 2019
Tchesnokov, 
Egor P.23 University of Alberta Götte, Matthias University of Alberta
University of Alberta & the Li Ka Shing Institute of 
Virology at University of Alberta 67%
Characterization of Ebola virus from an ongoing outbreak 
in Ituri and North Kivu, DR Congo to guide to response 
activities
2019 McMullan, Laura K.24 CDC Albarino, Cesar CDC CDC 89%
Broad spectrum antiviral remdesivir inhibits human endemic 
and zoonotic deltacoronaviruses with a highly divergent 
RNA dependent RNA polymerase
2019 Brown, Ariane J.25 UNCCH
Sheahan, 
Timothy P UNCCH UNCCH; VUMC 80%
Abbreviations: NHS, National Health Service; PFRI, publicly funded research institution; USAMRIID, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases; UNCCH, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; CDC, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention; VUMC, Vanderbilt University Medical Center; NIAID, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.
a For the purpose of this paper we defined PFRIs as including universities, hospitals, government agencies, research funding bodies, or any other institution that receives public funds as well as charities relying on donations from the public.
Publication Title Year First Author First Author Affiliation Final Author Final Author Affiliation Specification Authors Affiliation PFRIa Percentage Affiliations PFRI
Table 1. Continued
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Table 2. Public Funding Into the Pre-Pandemic R&D of Remdesivir
Grant or Project Name Amount (If Available) PFRIs Involved
Relevant 
Publication(s) Direct Citation From Article
Core Funding Unknown CDC
Siegel et al18; Lo 
et al16; Jordan et 
al20; McMullan 
et al24
Siegel et al18: "CDC core funding supported the work done by M.K.L. at CDC"; Lo et al16: "This work was funded by CDC core 
funding";  Jordan et al20: "CDC core funding supported MKL and CFS [two co-authors from the CDC]"; Lo et al21: "This work is 
supported by (…) core funding at CDC (to M.K.L., J.M.G., N.R.P., J.D.K., S.T.N., S.R.Z., and C.F.S.)"; McMullan et al24: "Funding: 
US CDC."
Core Funding Unknown USMRAIID Siegel et al18
"These studies were in part supported by the JSTO-CBD of the DTRA under Plan No. CB10218."  In the article it is mentioned 
that: "The partnership with government organizations, including CDC and USAMRIID, that generated the screening data and 
conducted the rhesus efficacy studies was critical to the successful identification of [remdesivir].”
CB10218 Unknown JSTO-CBD DTRA Warren et al13 "Studies at USAMRIID were in part supported by the JSTO-CBD of the DTRA under plan #CB10218."
R01AI113321 $1 659 997 NIH, Boston University Warren et al13 "Work in the Fearns laboratory was supported by NIH R01AI113321."
Core Funding Unknown Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust Jacobs et al14 "The work was funded by the Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust, without external grants."
Core Funding Unknown Medical Research Council UK Jacobs et al14 "Sequencing and bioinformatics analyses were funded by the Medical Research Council."
102789/Z/13/Z Unknown Wellcome Trust, MRC–University of Glasgow Centre for Virus Research Jacobs et al
14 "E[mma] C. T[hompson] [the final author of the paper] is funded by the Wellcome Trust (grant number 102789/Z/13/Z)."
R01 AI132178 $3 788 580 NIH, UNC-Chapel Hill Brown et al25 "We would like to acknowledge the following funding sources (...) and a partnership grant from the NIH, United States (5R01AI132178).”
R01 AI108197 $4 235 454 NIH, Vanderbilt University Sheahan et al
15; 
Agostini et al19 Sheahan et al: "Grants from the NIH AI108197"; Agostini et al: "This work was supported by the NIH grants R01AI108197."
U19 AI109761 $32 615 934 NIH, Columbia University Sheahan et al15 Sheahan et al: "Grants from the NIH (...) AI109761."
P30 DK065988 Unknown NIH, UNC- Chapel Hill Sheahan et al
15; 
Agostini et al19
Sheahan et al: "Cystic Fibrosis and Pulmonary Research and Treatment Center(…) and NIH P30DK065988)"; Agostini et al: 
"UNC Cystic Fibrosis and Pulmonary Diseases Research and Treatment Center (…) NIH P30DK065988."
BOUCHE15RO Unknown UNC-Chapel Hill Cystic Fibrosis and Pulmonary Research Treatment Center
Sheahan et al15; 
Agostini et al19
Sheahan et al: "Cystic Fibrosis and Pulmonary Research and Treatment Center BOUCHE15RO"; Agostini et al: "the UNC Cystic 
Fibrosis and Pulmonary Diseases Research and Treatment Center BOUCHE15RO."
U19 AI109680 $34 907 030 NIH, University of Alabama,  UNC-Chapel Hill, and VUMC
Sheahan et al15; 
Agostini et al19; 
Brown et al25 
Sheahan et al: "Antiviral Drug Discovery and Development Center (5U19AI109680)"; Agostini et al: "This work was supported 
by the Antiviral Drug Discovery and Development Center 5U19AI109680"; Brown et al: "We would like to acknowledge the 
following funding sources, Antiviral Drug Discovery and Development Center (5U19AI109680)."
5T32AI089554 $726 584 NIH, Vanderbilt University Agostini et al19 "This work was supported by (…) NIH grants (…) 5T32AI089554 (M.L.A.)."
T32 AI007419 Unknown NIH, UNC-Chapel Hill Brown et al25 "KD was supported by a fellowship from the NIH NIAID virology training grant (T32 AI007419)."
Postdoctoral 
Fellowship Unknown
American Society for Microbiology 
Postdoctoral Fellowship, CDC Lo et al
16 "Anne L. Hotard is supported by an American Society for Microbiology Postdoctoral Fellowship."
Intramural Research 
Program Unknown NIAID, NIH Lo et al
21 "This work is supported by the Intramural Research Program of NIAID, NIH (to F.F., J.C., H.F., and E.d.W.)."
Clinical Trial Funding Unknown NIAID, NIH Mulangu et al22 "Supported primarily by the NIAID, NIH."
HHSN261200800001E Unknown National Cancer Institute Mulangu et al22 "Some funding for NIAID was provided by the National Cancer Institute through a contract (HHSN261200800001E) with Leidos Biomedical Research and subcontracts to the Mitchell Group."
CIHR159507 Unknown Canadian Institutes of Health Research Tchesnokov et al23 "This research was funded by grants from the CIHR (grant number 159507)."
Abbreviations: R&D, Research and development; NHS, National Health Service; PFRI, publicly funded research institution; USAMRIID, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases; CDC, Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention; CIHR, Canadian Institutes of Health Research; JSTO-CBD, The Joint Science and Technology Office for Chemical and Biological Defense; DTRA, Defense Threat Reduction Agency; NIAID, National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Disease; NIH: National Institutes of Health; VUMC, Vanderbilt University Medical Center.
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Table 3. Clinical Trial Sponsorship of 24 Clinical Trials on Remdesivir (GS-5734), and the Contribution of Publicly Funded Research Institutions Therein
ClinicalTrials.gov 
Identifier Name Trial Main Sponsor Sponsor Category Type of PFRI
a Country That PFRI Is 
Based in
NCT04257656 A trial of remdesivir in adults with severe COVID-19 Capital Medical University PFRI University China
NCT04385719 Drug-drug interactions between remdesivir and commonly used antiretroviral therapy (RemTLAR) Makerere University PFRI University Uganda
NCT04252664 A trial of remdesivir in adults with mild and moderate COVID-19 Capital Medical University PFRI University China
NCT04431453 Study to evaluate the safety, tolerability, pharmacokinetics, and efficacy of remdesivir (GS-5734™) in participants from birth to <18 years of age with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (CARAVAN) Gilead Sciences Gilead Sciences NA NA
NCT04302766 Expanded access remdesivir (RDV; GS-5734™) U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command PFRI Government agency US
NCT04292899 Study to evaluate the safety and antiviral activity of remdesivir (GS-5734™) in Participants with severe coronavirus disease (COVID-19) Gilead Sciences Gilead Sciences NA NA
NCT04365725 Multicenter, retrospective study of the effects of remdesivir in the treatment of severe COVID-19 infections (REMDECO-19)
Assistance Publique - Hôpitaux 
de Paris PFRI Hospital France
NCT04292730 Study to evaluate the safety and antiviral activity of remdesivir (GS-5734™) in Participants with moderate coronavirus disease (COVID-19) compared to standard of care treatment Gilead Sciences Gilead Sciences NA NA
NCT04323761 Expanded access treatment protocol: remdesivir (RDV; GS-5734) for the treatment of SARS-CoV2 (CoV) infection (COVID-19) Gilead Sciences Gilead Sciences NA NA
NCT04410354 Study of merimepodib in combination with remdesivir in adult patients with advanced COVID-19 ViralClear Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Other private actor NA NA
NCT04409262 A study to evaluate the efficacy and safety of remdesivir plus tocilizumab compared with remdesivir plus placebo in hospitalized participants with severe COVID-19 pneumonia (REMDACTA) Hoffmann-La Roche
Other private 
actor NA NA
NCT02818582 GS-5734 to assess the antiviral activity, longer-term clearance of Ebola virus, and safety in male Ebola survivors with evidence of Ebola virus persistence in semen  NIAID PFRI Government agency US
NCT04401579 Adaptive COVID-19 Treatment Trial 2 (ACTT-2) NIAID PFRI Government agency US
NCT04330690 Treatments for COVID-19: Canadian Arm of the SOLIDARITY Trial (CATCO) Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre PFRI Hospital Canada
NCT04280705 Adaptive COVID-19 Treatment Trial (ACTT) NIAID PFRI Government agency US
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NCT04321616 The efficacy of different anti-viral drugs in COVID-19 infected patients Oslo University Hospital PFRI Hospital Norway
NCT03719586 Investigational therapeutics for the treatment of people with Ebola virus disease NIAID PFRI Government agency US
NCT04315948 Trial of Treatments for COVID-19 in Hospitalized Adults (DisCoVeRy) Institut National de la Santé Et de la Recherche Médicale, France PFRI Government agency France
NCT04314817 Adverse Events Related to Treatments Used Against Coronavirus Disease 2019 (CovidTox) Groupe Hospitalier Pitie-Salpetriere PFRI Hospital France
NCT04365764 Effect of treatments in patients hospitalized for severe COVID-19 pneumonia: a multicenter cohort study Groupe Hospitalier Pitie-Salpetriere PFRI Hospital France
NCT04356417 Long-term use of drugs that could prevent the risk of serious COVID-19 infections or make it worse (TRAPSAH)
Assistance Publique - Hôpitaux 
de Paris PFRI Hospital France
NCT04349410 The Fleming [FMTVDM] Directed COVID-19 Treatment Protocol (FMTVDM) The Camelot Foundation PFRI Charity US
NCT04278404 Pharmacokinetics, pharmacodynamics, and safety profile of understudied drugs administered to children per standard of care (POPS or POP02) Duke University PFRI University US
NCT04351503 A systems approach to predict the outcome of SARS-CoV-2 in the population of a city; COVID-19 University Hospital, Basel, Switzerland PFRI Hospital Switzerland
Abbreviations: PFRI, publicly funded research institution; NIAID, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease; COVID-19, coronavirus disease 2019; SARS-CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
a PFRI is an acronym for publicly-funded research institution. For the purpose of this paper we defined PFRIs as including universities, hospitals, government agencies, research funding bodies, or any other institution that receives public 
funding as well as charities relying on donations from the public. 
ClinicalTrials.gov 
Identifier Name Trial Main Sponsor Sponsor Category Type of PFRI
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(ViralClear Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Hoffman-La Roche) 
and 18 by “PFRIs.” Within the category of PFRIs sponsored 
trials, 7 were sponsored by (university) hospitals or health 
centres, 4 by universities, 6 by government agencies, and 1 by 
a charity. These PFRIs were located across the United States, 
China, Uganda, France, Switzerland, Norway, and Canada.
Discussion
The Risk-Reward Nexus Applied to Remdesivir
The Collective, Cumulative and Uncertain Characteristics of 
Biomedical Innovation 
The Risk-Reward Nexus was first proposed by Lazonick 
and Mazzucato8 and considers innovation as a collective, 
cumulative, and uncertain process. Here we apply these 
characteristics to the R&D of remdesivir. 
As the remdesivir case study illustrates, biomedical 
innovation is collective, meaning it requires the skills and 
efforts of people from different backgrounds and often involves 
a network of institutions.8 These collective contributions 
may be in the form of knowledge (eg, information sharing), 
human resources (eg, scientists, clinical trial participants), 
infrastructure (eg, research facilities, hospitals), and financial 
resources (eg, governments grants). In 2012, Gilead-affiliated 
authors published the first study about the new compound 
GS-5734 alongside several other compounds that showed 
broad spectrum antiviral activity. In 2014, in the midst of the 
Ebola outbreak, a research initiative hosted by the University 
of Alabama at Birmingham received a large National Institute 
of Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID) grant to initiate 
safety and efficacy studies of remdesivir along other antivirals 
against high-priority emerging infections.26 Vanderbilt 
University, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
(UNCCH) and the University of Alabama at Birmingham 
conducted several studies looking at remdesivir’s activity 
against betacoronavirae, such as the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) and the Middle East respiratory syndrome 
(MERS).15,19,25 A collaboration with the CDC and the United 
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
Diseases (USAMRIID) screened Gilead’s compound library 
for potential Ebola virus treatments and tested remdesivir 
against RNA viruses.18 Before the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the NIH sponsored two clinical trials in humans exploring 
remdesivir’s antiviral activity against Ebola. The larger of 
these was funded and sponsored by the NIAID and the NIH, 
and further supported by the African Coalition for Epidemic 
Research, Response, and Training and the government of the 
DRC. The WHO led the trial logistics, while Gilead provided 
the drug for comparison with other promising Ebola virus 
therapies.10 In this study, we identified that more than half 
of the authors of the pre-pandemic scientific literature were 
affiliated with PFRIs in 9 countries and the WHO. Publicly 
sponsored clinical trials for COVID-19 are currently 
underway in at least 7 countries, and involve a wide variety 
of actors, including (university) hospitals or health centres, 
universities, government agencies, and a charity. Thus, 
significant institutional support from public actors, both in 
terms of funding as well as logistics and research, pushed 
remdesivir along the development pipeline. 
The remdesivir case study highlights that biomedical 
innovation is cumulative, meaning that innovation that 
originated earlier is being used in the development of a new 
innovation or further developed.8 Remdesivir was originally 
developed as a broad spectrum antiviral,12 building on the 
ProTide technology developed at the University of Cardiff in 
the 1990s.27 It was then undergoing safety and efficacy studies 
against high-priority infections and found to be effective 
against RNA viruses, suggesting that it could be developed as 
a broad-spectrum antiviral against coronaviruses.19 Between 
2018 and 2019, intravenous application of remdesivir was 
studied for Ebola in the DRC, where it was found to be 
adequately tolerated but less effective compared to other 
therapies.22 Based on this previously gained knowledge, 
remdesivir was first given to COVID-19 patients on a 
compassionate-use basis and is currently undergoing at least 
24 interventional clinical trials for COVID-19 disease.28 
The remdesivir case study shows that biomedical innovation 
is uncertain, meaning that there is neither a guarantee that 
investments into R&D will actually result in innovation, 
nor a guaranteed return, whether financially or in the form 
of equitable access.8 Remdesivir’s initial development as an 
antiviral against hepatitis C is an example for the high-risk of 
early research, with many compounds not making it further 
than the early R&D stages.29 US government investment 
was necessary to identify and repurpose the compound 
for application in Ebola virus disease, which had limited 
potential for financial return for Gilead Sciences. After other 
treatments were found to be superior to remdesivir against 
Ebola virus disease, the compound was shelved again until 
COVID-19 emerged.30 Early results showed some likely 
clinical benefits in certain patient groups,31,32 which led the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to issue an emergency 
use authorization for severe COVID-19 disease.33 Multiple 
clinical trials are currently comparing remdesivir to placebo 
and other treatments. Dexamethasone, a cheap and widely 
available drug compared to remdesivir, showed to reduce 
mortality in hospitalised patients.34 Further clinical trials are 
needed to establish the effectiveness of remdesivir compared 
to dexamethasone and other competitors to determine 
whether remdesivir will become a treatment of choice for 
COVID-19, which highlights yet again the uncertainty of 
biomedical innovation.
Equity in Public Risk-Taking and Reward 
After focusing on the collective, cumulative and uncertain 
characteristics of the innovation process of remdesivir, we 
assess the equity aspect of the Risk-Reward Nexus, hereby 
applying a global health equity focus. We address herein the 
following questions: who has taken the risks, who gets the 
rewards, and is the degree of the rewards proportional to the 
risks taken? 
Who are the actors that invested labor and capital in the 
R&D of remdesivir? The innovative compound, GS-5734, 
was developed by the US-based biopharmaceutical company 
Gilead Sciences, applying amongst other processes and 
methods the ProTide technology developed at the University 
of Cardiff, UK, which received significant amounts of 
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European public funding at the time. For the further R&D 
of remdesivir pre-pandemic, this study identified at least 20 
different sources of public funding, including research grants, 
academic fellowships, and core funding from government 
agencies. The amount of funding was traceable for 6 of these 20 
public funding grants, totalling nearly US$78 million, which 
is likely an underreporting of the total public contribution. 
The NIH and CDC were the main public funders observed 
in this study, supported by PFRIs and public funders from at 
least 3 countries. Additionally, the US Department of Defense 
collaborated with Gilead through the signing of an Other 
Transaction Agreement with a total contract value of nearly 
$50 million not captured in our findings.35,36 We recorded 24 
registered clinical trials, of which 6 were sponsored by private 
actors and 18 by PFRIs located in at least 7 countries. This 
shows that public actors from multiple countries played a 
crucial role along remdesivir’s R&D pipeline, and continue to 
do so in the clinical trial stages. Our observation is supported 
by the findings that all 210 new molecular entities approved 
by the FDA between 2010 and 2016 received NIH funding.37 
Furthermore, public funding played a major role in the late 
stage development of at least 25% of drugs approved by the 
FDA between 2008 and 2017.38 Overall, total biomedical R&D 
expenditure in 2012 amounted to US$81.8 billion in Europe 
and US$119.3 billion in the United States, of which the public 
sector directly contributed US$28.1 billion and US$48.9 
billion respectively, equivalent to 30%-35% of biomedical 
R&D.39 Finally, the public sector is a main funder of high-
risk, early research,40 making public investments especially 
important for priority research areas where, despite significant 
health need, a lack of private sector investment prevails.41
Which actors ultimately benefit from remdesivir as a 
biomedical innovation? In our current biopharmaceutical 
system, the owner of the key patent rights (this may be the 
owner of a patent or a licensee) has the main control over the 
extraction of rewards. This means they hold decision power 
regarding pricing, production, and reimbursement agreements 
with governments and health systems across the world. The 
provisional patent application (61/047263) claiming the 
remdesivir compound formula lists two Gilead in-house 
scientists as co-inventors.10 In October 2015, Gilead Sciences 
affiliated scientists filed a patent application (62/239696) 
associated with remdesivir describing “Methods for Treating 
Arenaviridae and Coronaviridae Virus Infections.”10 Shortly 
after, researchers largely affiliated with PFRIs announced 
the “discovery of a novel small molecule GS-5734” against 
Ebola virus in a Nature publication.13 A study on the impact 
of public grant funding on patenting by pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology firms has shown that NIH funding increases 
private-sector patenting, with every additional $10 million in 
NIH funding generating 2.3 additional patents owned by the 
private sector.42 
In March 2020, Gilead applied for “orphan status” for 
remdesivir in the United States, which grants significant tax 
credits and reduced market approval fees. These financial 
incentives were created to foster investment into rare diseases, 
however, COVID-19 was anything but rare at the time 
and after public outcry Gilead rescinded its application.43 
According to estimations by researchers affiliated with PFRIs, 
the production price of remdesivir is merely $0.93 per day 
of treatment.44 In May 2020, Gilead granted non-exclusive 
voluntary licenses to five generic manufacturers to distribute 
remdesivir to 127 countries for the duration of the pandemic.45 
However, this agreement excluded 3.7 billion people and still 
leaves open the question how heavily affected countries not 
included in the list, such as Brazil, Peru, Mexico, China, and 
Russia can access and afford remdesivir. After donating the 
remaining stockpile of remdesivir to the US government,46 
Gilead set the price for governments of developed 
countries at $390 per vial, or $2,340 for a 5-day treatment 
course, and at $520, or $3120, respectively, for US private 
insurance companies.47 In comparison, the Indian generic 
drug manufacturer Cipla Ltd priced its generic version of 
remdesivir at $53.34 per vial.48 The US Department of Health 
and Human Services secured more than 500 000 treatment 
courses, representing 100% of Gilead’s production in July, and 
90% in August and September 2020.49 This agreement and 
the limited global production capacity will leave most of the 
world’s population without access to remdesivir, in addition 
to the strain on health systems caused by the high prices. 
Despite the global efforts in the R&D process highlighted 
above, the remdesivir case study demonstrates that rewards 
are extracted by few actors involved. 
Risk and Reward From a Global Health Equity Perspective
After establishing the extent of public contributions in the 
R&D of remdesivir and the limited public returns, we question 
the proportionality of the risks and rewards of remdesivir 
from a global health equity perspective. The WHO definition 
of equity in health encompasses two aspects. Firstly, equity in 
health, or health status, means “the attainment by all citizens of 
the highest possible level of physical, psychological and social 
well-being.”50 A large majority of the global population will not 
be able to access remdesivir when falling ill with COVID-19, 
denying them the fair opportunity to achieve their full health 
potential. The public risk taking and contributions in the 
innovation process, which included a significant number 
of patients across multiple countries (including the DRC, 
China, and the United Kingdom) who voluntarily risked their 
health by participating in clinical trials to advance science, 
should be reflected in the rewards, meaning global equitable 
and affordable access for all. However, as discussed above, 
this is currently not the case. The collective characteristic 
of innovation makes measuring the specific contributions 
of the various actors (public and private) difficult, further 
hindered by a lack of transparency in the biomedical R&D 
system. Private actors such as Gilead extract significantly 
more rewards, while incurring high costs for health systems 
and limiting access for patients. The uncertain characteristic 
of innovation is reflected in the need for public investment 
especially in early, high-risk research, and financial incentives 
for the private sector. The cumulative characteristic generates 
a “time-lag” between risk-taking and return, making public 
contributions especially at earlier stages less visible. 
Secondly, equity in healthcare means “healthcare 
resources are allocated according to need.”50 This requires an 
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understanding of who the most vulnerable people are in our 
global society, for instance through vulnerability mapping 
on national, regional and global levels,51 and the willingness 
to address these inequities by providing treatment to those 
with the greatest need first. Yet, in the current pharmaceutical 
system, ability and willingness to pay are the main definer of 
who will be able to realise their need.50 Despite the collective 
involvement of many actors, both public and private, from 
high-, middle- and low-income countries across the globe in 
the R&D of remdesivir, only privileged few patients, primarily 
from high-income countries with strong health systems will 
be able to ultimately access the treatment. 
The Risk-Reward Nexus showcases a complex involvement 
of public and private actors in the biomedical innovation 
process. Currently, public investment in biomedical R&D is 
justified as remedying market failure where the private sector 
is underinvesting, such as high-risk early research or research 
areas with limited financial return. However, this approach 
of public sector risk-taking for private sector rewards of 
biomedical innovation is unproportional and further increases 
inequities in health and healthcare. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has underlined the need for making biomedical innovation a 
global public good as proposed by the Lancet Commission on 
Investing in Health.52 Simultaneously, the Risk-Reward Nexus 
shows that the current definition of global public goods as 
non-rivalrous and non-excludable (yet, treating one person 
reduces the quantity available and access can be prevented53) 
is restrictive and does not account for the complexity and 
nuances of socialised public risk-taking, neither does it offer 
solutions for extracting public rewards. The public (state) thus 
needs to take a more pro-active market-shaping rather than 
market-fixing role, thereby steering innovation, ensuring that 
patents do not hinder global equitable access and affordable 
pricing, and safeguarding a global medicines supply.54 This 
requires biomedical innovation to be viewed in the broader 
concept of public value rather than global public goods to 
prevent similar equity issues in the future as currently seen in 
the COVID-19 pandemic and highlighted in the remdesivir 
case study. Further research is necessitated on the setting of 
priorities to address (health) inequities, the establishment of 
decision-making processes that are inclusive and the need for 
focusing on outcomes of research policies and priorities.55,56 
Lastly, a framework is needed that allows for a public return 
which, beyond focusing on financial return, emphasises 
health equity through global equitable access and affordable 
pricing. 
Due to the explorative nature of the methods of this study, 
our approach towards assessing the public contributions 
to different parts of remdesivir’s R&D has a number of 
limitations. The restriction of the systematic literature search 
to the pre-pandemic literature did not capture all novel 
research published on remdesivir and its efficacy against 
coronaviruses since the COVID-19 pandemic, thereby 
underestimating the public contributions and risk-taking in 
recent months. By recording the clinical trials on remdesivir 
we tried to capture later stage research as well. Secondly, it was 
not possible to specify exact amounts for all public funding 
grants due to a lack of transparency of grant databases, and 
the difficulty of tracing back exact amounts even when grant 
numbers were listed. Consequently, we likely underestimated 
the total contribution of public funds into remdesivir’s R&D. 
A final limitation to our approach is that conducting a 
systematic literature search focusing on remdesivir failed to 
capture the fundamental research into molecular chemistry 
that led to the methods and processes by which compound 
GS-5734 was created and the role of public funding therein. 
An important example is the ProTide technology developed 
at the University of Cardiff receiving European public funding 
in the 1990s, which is used in the GS-5734 compound 
structure.27,57,58
Conclusion 
This case study of remdesivir discussed the collective, 
cumulative and uncertain characteristics of the innovation 
process and highlights the lack of transparency in our 
biomedical R&D system, the need for public investment in 
the innovation process, and the “time-lag” between risk-
taking and reward. It further showed the inequity in public 
risk-taking and reward, resulting in rewards to few actors 
holding the key patent rights, while the return to the public in 
the form of equitable access and affordable pricing is limited. 
Beyond the necessity of treating remdesivir as a global public 
good, we argue that biomedical innovation needs to be 
viewed in the broader concept of public value creation. This 
requires further research on the setting of research priorities, 
the establishment of inclusive processes for decision-making 
and the development of a framework for public return 
emphasising health equity. Finally, with this study we aimed 
to create an analysis framework applicable to other health 
innovations relevant to the COVID-19 pandemic and new 
health technologies more generally. 
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